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How should the current impasse between the European Union and Turkey be interpreted, 
and how should Turkey react? 
 
Commissioner Olli Rehn says there is no train crash, but rather a slowing down because 
of works on the line. The Commission manifestly seeks to avoid a crisis, while being 
obliged to react to the non-implementation of the Ankara Protocol. Actually one can read 
the measures taken – namely to freeze (or not to open) 8 out of the 35 chapters of 
accession negotiations – in even lower key than Olli Rehn. The so-called ‘negotiations’ 
are not really negotiations at all, rather a process for monitoring Turkey’s unilateral 
adoption of the EU acquis. Turkey can perfectly well carry on its long process of 
unilateral convergence on the EU acquis in any case. The Commission’s staff will be 
happy to remain in constant informal contact with Mr Babacan’s team. Whether this 
process continues in or out of formal negotiations does not really matter at this stage, 
and the Commission will continue to review progress in its regular reports in any case. 
This requires that Turkey sees these measures as contributing to the ongoing 
modernization of Turkey’s democracy and economic governance. Turkey already has full 
access to EU markets through the customs union, so this not a matter of trading 
market–opening concessions, but rather one of choosing anchorage on European 
standards to improve domestic governance.  
 
Of course there are deeper political issues here at stake, which cannot be swept under 
the carpet. What are the underlying intentions of the EU and its member states? Or, 
even more important but harder to assess, how may the political attitudes of the EU and 
its member states evolve over the next ten years (the shortest conceivable time frame 
for accession)? As of today Turkey has a serious constituency of support in the EU. Italy, 
Finland, Spain, Sweden, UK among the member states, together with the Commission, 
which wants the negotiations to succeed (assuming a solution to the institutional 
questions left unanswered by non-ratification of the Constitution). The new member 
states are not against. This really leaves France, Germany and Austria representing the 
objections of ‘old Europe’, and then the special case of Cyprus. 
 
Will the attitude of old Europe change, and if so over what time horizon? The objections 
of old Europe are a mix of concerns of the elites for the governability of an EU of over 30 
member states (e.g. 27 + Croatia, Turkey and in due course other Balkan states) and, 
as regards Turkey, popular and indeed populist concerns about immigration, European 
identity, Islam and terrorism. On the EU’s institutional/constitutional issues there is 
virtual consensus over the broad need for a set of reforms in any case, with or without 
Turkey. These will have to be finessed through the processes of negotiation and 
ratification in due course, maybe soon after France’s presidential election in mid-2007.    
 More difficult is the immigration-European identity-Islam-terrorism nexus of issues, as 
currently perceived by public opinion. Europe and Turkey are both still afflicted by the 
9/11 syndrome; not quite the hysteria seen in the US, but still very serious societal 
tensions aggravated with the spread of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks in 
Madrid, London and Istanbul, the assassinations in Holland, the vandalism in the Paris 
banlieues and the Danish cartoon affair. Any moderately-well informed citizens in Europe 
know that immigrant Turks have not been responsible for acts of violence, Turkey is not 
a source of radical Islam, and Turkey has the most secularized and democratic polity of 
any country of Muslim culture. However for some populist  newspapers and politicians in 
Europe this is too much detail. Islamophobia, due to Osama bin Laden and various 
radical Islamic preachers in Europe’s mosques, is currently a rough image in the mind-
set of European public opinion.  
 
Turkish immigrant communities are caught up in this image to some degree. Objectively 
there could and should be a progressive transformation of these populist perceptions, 
and even a 180 degree turn around regarding people of Turkish origin and Turkey as a 
state. The post 9/11 semi-hysteria should calm down, as the global terror phenomenum 
is hopefully progressively overcome. But as this is done Europe and its new immigrant 
communities will have to come to terms with each other. This is unavoidable. The 
immigrant communities will not be going home. On the contrary they progressively 
become citizens of member states of the European Union.  
 
At the same time we now observe the rise of moderate, non-violent Islamist political 
parties in the South Mediterranean Arab countries. While no-one talks there of following 
the Turkish model, and indeed the Kemalist inheritance in Turkey is unique, a familiar 
model of transformation of these Islamist parties can be detected: as they approach or 
reach power their agendas become increasingly ‘ordinary’ political agendas with declining 
religiosity in their operational programmes. The EU begins to take note of these trends. 
The popular legitimacy of these ‘Muslim democrats’ is evidently growing in much of the 
Arab-Mediterranean world, contrasting with the depressingly authoritarian if not 
repressive regimes presently in power there. In this context Turkey as a political and 
societal success story should come to be appreciated more widely. Even Pope Benedict 
seems to have noticed this now, and changed his mind over Turkey’s possible EU 
accession, which is all the more remarkable in view of his supposed infallibility.  
 
At the same time European attitudes to immigration could and should change, and 
indeed have begun to do so. Europe is going to have a demographic labour shortage. 
East Europe has even worse demographic deficit problems. Large-scale immigration from 
Africa will continue to be resisted. Turkey in a decade or two will have seen its own 
demographic profile change, from quite rapid growth now, to zero growth by 2020. The 
idea then of a certain renewal of immigration from Turkey could come to be seen as a 
rather reasonable option. But first Europe’s policy makers have to come to terms with 
their looming demographic/pensions crisis. This begins to be the case, with both 
Germany and the UK raising the retirement age last week. But the full future impact has 
yet to be digested by the politicians. Germany could be the country where a change of 
political attitude towards the Turkish candidature could be the most crucial, as the 
number of German citizens of Turkish origin grows, and as the integration of second and 
third generations of new minority communities is progressively normalized, and the 
demographic deficit strikes hard.  
 
Finally, what about the Cyprus question? While most of Europe regarded Mr Denktas as 
having been completely unreasonable in his time, now Mr Papadopoulos is the 
unreasonable party, while Mr Talat is absolutely reasonable. How should Turkey react to 
the unreasonable Papadopoulos? Escalate? No, better reinforce Mr Talat’s 
reasonableness with Ankara’s reasonableness. Encourage Mr Talat to continue to settle 
the property questions, with compensation to departed Greek Cypriot owners, and 
legalization of new titles. Repatriate part of the Turkish army. Northern Cyprus is ridiculously over-militarised. The visitor sees a Turkish army base behind every bush. 
There is no risk in, say, halving these forces. The UN green line remains, and the threat 
of Greek Cypriot invasion of the North is not of this world. Besides reinforcements could 
be called in within an hour. Mr Papadopoulos says he is interested in reviving the UN 
process, but all readings of Greek Cypriot claims for renegotiation (which are however 
not transparent) seem to be in favour of a more strongly centralized federal state, which 
looks like being unacceptable to the Turkish North. But the UN game will go on, since the 
EU says that it looks to this for a final solution, but I suspect that few really believes in 
this. As regards the opening of Turkish ports for Greek Cypriot ships and of Northern 
Cypriot ports for anyone, the status quo is in both cases politically ridiculous and of 
minor economic significance. For Turkey to move first would have the clear advantage of 
improving its reputational score even more.  
 
So, dear Turkey, play it long and cool. Accession is a decade away in the most optimistic 
of cases. This has a positive side to it, since it gives time for realities and above all 
perceptions to change. It would be completely futile and indeed counter-productive, to 
make the following speech (no doubt favoured by some) “either the EU gives a clear 
message today along the lines ‘complete alignment on the Copenhagen criteria and you 
are guaranteed entry’, or Turkey will walk away from Europeanisation and go its own 
way”. In the meantime carry on with your huge modernization mission, with special 
emphasis on improving educational achievement of the bottom half of the system (the 
Turkish university educated elite is already famously impressive), and reform of various 
aspects of the judiciary and media freedoms that are still archaic (viz. Pamuk-type case). 
Continue alignment on the EU acquis unilaterally, with priority for those elements that 
are clearly useful for Turkey’s own economic and political system. 
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